I. Introduction
It is just over a quarter o f a century since the publication of the seminal paper by Sandmo [1971] that formally introduced a systematic formulation of the competitive firm 's behavior under output price uncertainty. The theory of the firm under uncertainty has been researched significantly since Sandmo [1971] by examining the firm 's operations under various sources of uncertainty in the firm 's operations: output price uncertainty, factor price uncertainty, and total (output and factor) price uncertainty. The studies by Chavas and Pope [1985] , Demers and Demers [1990] , Hartman [1976] , H orbulyk [1993] , Paris [1989] , Pope [1980] , and Sandmo [1971] have examined the impact of output price uncertainty; Ormiston and Schlee [1994] , the impact of factor cost uncertain ty; Booth [1983] and Paris [1988] , the impact of total price uncertainty.
These contributions have invariably assumed that the firm 's objective is to maximize the share holder's expected utility function under a given source of price uncertainty and report the compara tive statics analysis for a mean-preserving increase in either output price or factor cost uncertainty. None of these studies evaluate the role of market interdependencies in determining a firm 's long-run equilibrium conditions under uncertainty.1
The present paper will examine the effect o f total price uncertainty on the firm 's long-run equilibrium where the probability distributions of output and factor prices are not independent. The role of mar ket interdependencies to achieve the firm 's equilib rium and the effect of changes in uncertainty on its optimum use of inputs is presented.
The next section describes the basic model of the firm under total price uncertainty and presents the requirements to achieve the long-run competitive equilibrium . Com parative statics results of increased uncertainty in output and input prices are derived in Section HI. A brief summary is present ed in the final section. The firm 's equilibrium under risk neutrality is discussed in the Appendix.
II. The Model
The model explains the firm 's long-run behavior which it chooses optimal capital ( K) and labor (L) to maximize the shareholder's expected utility func tion. Let t/(u ) be the von Neumann-M orgenstern utility function of the firm with the property that U'(tt) > 0 and U"(it) < 0 for firms that are risk averse. 2 Hence, the firm 's decision problem is to
where it is profit, Q is output, p, r, and w are the uncertain product price, cost of capital, and wage rate, respectively, representing stochastic random variables with the joint probability distribution function m(p,r,w) defined for p, r, w > 0 with finite moments. The respective expected values for p, r, and w are |xp, | j l and |xw. The assumptions of an interior solution of the firm 's equilibrium to exist are that the firm 's pro duction function Q = Q(K, L) is assumed to be strictly concave with factor marginal products strictly positive and increasing at a deceasing rate, i.e., Ql > 0, Qk > 0, Qu < 0, and g K K < 0. Let E[U(tt)] = h(K,L). Then, the first-order conditions for optimization of ( 1) are '
Expanding the expectation operator in (2) and (3) gives
The firm 's equilibrium under uncertainty in (4) and (5) depends on the sign of the covariance terms, cov[l/'('ir),r], cov[£/'(tt),w], and cov[U'(ir),p]. It will be shown below that the signs and the firm 's equilibrium under uncertainty depend on: (i) the relationship between the output and factor markets as determined by the properties of the joint proba bility distribution function of prices and (ii) the firm 's attitude toward risk. Market interdependen cies have been ignored by the previous studies which focused only on the firm 's attitude toward risk. In this paper, market interdependencies are accounted for by examining the joint probability distribution function of wages, capital costs, and output prices.
Let k(p,w|r) = ~n where k(p,w|r) is the joint conditional probability density function of p and w given r, g(r) is the non-zero marginal proba bility density function of r, with in(p,r,w) as defined before. Additionally, let E\U'(tt)] = If. Then the covariance term cov[t/'(iT),r|, in (4), can be written as
dr. (7) where (7) can be written as
The sign of cov[U'(iT),r] in (8 ) depends on the sign of the terms on the right-hand-side integral of the equation because (r -|x ) is an increasing function of r. But
where k = k(p,w|r). Using the result in (9), the sign of the covariance term in (8 ) can now be determined as
Similarly, the sign of the remaining covariance terms in (4) and (5) can be shown to be determined as
sign e U "W + * x ?^ v dp e (12)
Using the results in (13)- (15) and in (4) and (5), one gets the well-established condition in the liter ature that the long-run equilibrium of a risk averse competitive firm is (16) (17) In other words, under the special case that the markets are independent, the firm 's attitude toward risk is sufficient to achieve the long-run equilib rium.
However, if markets are not independent, i.e.. dk (p,w|r) df(p,r[w) dr ' dw + 0 , and de (r,w[p) _ _ _ run equilibrium o f a risk averse competitive firm from (4) and (5) is where f = f(p,r|w) and e = e(r,w|p) are the respective joint conditional probability density functions o f p and r given w and r and w given p, defined for the non-zero marginal density functions of w and p,t(w) and n(p), as f(p,r|w) = and e(r,w|p) = m(p.r,w) n(p) '
The assumption that markets are independent ■ r , dk(p,w|r) df(p,r|w) " , im plies that -^-L-= 0 , -J-= 0 , and
Clearly, these partial derivatives can be equal to zero if and only if m (p,r,w ) = n(p)g(r)t(w), that is the output and factor markets are independent.' In the special case, when the out put and factor markets are independent, and under the assumption that firms are risk averse, the sign of the covariance terms in ( 1 0 )- ( 12) can be deter mined unambiguously as
Let the optim um capital and labor levels employed by the firm in (16)- (17) and in (18)- (19) be (K \L A) and (K", LB), respectively. Clearly, once market interdependencies are taken into considera tion, KA # KB and LA + LB. W hether the input lev els in (18) and (19) are greater than or less than the input levels in (16) and (17) depends on interde pendencies among output and factor markets that determine the sign of covariance terms in ( 1 0 )-( 1 2 ) and the resulting equilibrium in (18) and (19).
One can develop scenarios on the structure of interrelationship among markets to examine the behavior of the firm under uncertainty. Consider the df(p,r|w) dw possibility that dk(p>w lr) > 0 , dr 0 , and defr,w IP) < o. For risk averse firms, one can dp then get unambiguous sign on the covariance terms in ( 1 0 )-( 1 2 ) resulting in the long-run equilibrium conditions of a risk averse competitive firm are identical to those reported in (16) and (17). This amounts to the conclusion that under uncertainty equilibrium and market interdependencies, the opti mal input levels of capital and labor for a risk averse firm would be lower than in certainty equi librium.
Additionally, the optimum input levels (KB and LB) under the special case of interdependent mar kets, where 0 , , 0 , and dr dw < 0 , can be compared with the optimum then the firm 's attitude toward risk is necessary but not sufficient to have an unambiguous sign on the covariance terms in ( 10 )-( 1 2 ) and determination of equilibrium under uncertainty in (4) and (5).6 If out put and input markets are interdependent, the longde(r,w|p) dp input levels (KA and LA ) under independent markets for a risk averse firm. The results are that the firm employs more of both inputs if markets are interde pendent: K1 * < KA and LB < L \ Hence, the interrela tionship among markets, established by the condi
III. Comparative Statics7
The role of market interdependencies in deriving the comparative statics results, related with changes in the probability distributions of output and input prices, of a competitive firm is presented in this sec tion. The effects of a marginal increase in price uncertainty are defined by the increased variability of the output and input price density functions in terms o f a mean preserving spread. Let us define P* = 7 p + 0 (20)
where ^ = p, /,'[U '(tt) | + co v[U '(Tr),p].
The partial derivative of the covariance terms in (29) and (30) 
where 0 . and 7 are the shift parameters which ini tially equal zero and one, respectively. Then a mean preserving spread for this type of shift in the densi ty functions of P*, r*, and w* leaves their means unchanged, that is dE(P*) = dE(7 P + 6 ,) = |x d-y + d0, = 0, (23) dE(r*) = dE(7 r + 0") = |xd7 + d0, = 0, (24) dE(w*) = dE(7 w + 0t) = (xw d7 + d0, = 0. (25) Then (23)-(25) imply d0.
dct>v[E/(TT),p] = f j By 1 » I(P -HOG -(r -|xr)K -
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By
e . e(r,w|p)drdw.
The covariance term s' sign in (31)- (33), and the subsequent comparative statics results of a mean preserving spread in the output and input price den sity functions in (29) and (30), are determined by the firm 's attitude toward risk, i.e., the sign of U"(ir), and the interrelationship among markets, andj!^. The firm 's attitude toward risk is necessary but not sufficient to have determinate comparative statics results in (29) and (30). de,
Differentiating the first-order conditions in (2) and (3), evaluated at 0 = 0 and 7 = 1, and using (26)- (28) 
IV. Concluding Comments
The literature on the behavior of a firm under uncertainty has generally overlooked the interde pendencies among output and factor markets. Under the special case that markets are indepen dent, the firm 's attitude toward risk is sufficient for deriving the long-run equilibrium conditions. It is im portant to incorporate the interrelationship among markets in examining the firm 's behavior under uncertainty. In this paper, a general model of the firm 's behavior under output and factor price uncertainty is developed to evaluate the role of mar ket interdependencies in analyzing the long-run equilibrium conditions.
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The results show that additional assumptions are necessary to derive the firm 's long-run equilibrium under uncertainty. M arket interdependencies play a central role in determining the firm 's long-run equi librium rendering previous results, described in the literature, as special cases of conditions reported here. Our findings also demonstrate that the firm 's attitude toward risk is necessary but not sufficient to obtain a long-run competitive equilibrium.
Notes
1. However, the analysis in Booth [ 1983 ] assumes that the output price and input prices are all drawn from a multivariate normal distribution. Complete independence and perfect correlation among output and input prices are special cases in his treatment. 2. The assumption that firms are risk averse needs further explanation. Since the firm 's profit is the only argument included in the profit func tion, the owners may prefer that managers exchange profit for less risk. If the firm 's own ers hold a diversified portfolio of assets rather than just this one firm, then they want their managers to be risk neutral and to maximize the firm 's expected utility of profit. In other words, departure from the assumption o f risk aversion is a real possibility. The recent trend in human resource management is toward perfor mance-based compensation, and prolification of stock options as part of the compensation package [Abowd and Bognano, 1994] . Koretz [1995] finds that, among a group of surveyed firms, performance of the firm was positively correlated with the degree of CEO ownership. This is not surprising as one o f the goals of per formance-based compensation is to deal with agency problem s that existed. Jensen and Meckling [1976] define owners as principals and the manager as owners' agent. If the man ager is a utility-maximizing individual, and his personal utility function is influenced by vari ables other than the owners,' then the manager may not always act in the best interest of the principals. However, in cases that the m anag e r's utility function is affected by the firm's profits, as is the case when compensation is performance-based, then the utility functions of the managers and the principals tend to coin 
, , " h' I = ----< °' and hK K hn -K l. > 0 4 In deriving (7) from (6 ), the result that / / k(p,w|r)dpdw = 1 is used.
pw 5. The assumption that output and input price dis tributions are independent could roughly be interpreted as prices of inputs and outputs being independently determined. The general equilibrium model of markets shows that input and output prices are determined within the market mechanism. For example, with deregu lated markets and rapid transmission of infor mation, transportation costs almost instanta neously adjust to the possible price volatility in the crude oil market, affecting all sectors of the economy. Therefore, relaxing the mutually independence o f price distribution assumption leads to a more realistic model that fits today's real-world economy. 6 . In other words, m arket interdependencies amount to having non-zero partial derivative of the conditional densities of output and input prices with respect to a given price. The condi .. dk(p,w|r) , " df(p,r|w) , " , tions -v -1 # 0 , -1 ¥= 0 , and -i I \ -dp ^ 0 imply an increase or decrease in ly. On the other hand, o implies a decrease in uncertainty of product market to the firm for an increase in output price.
7. We thank an anonymous referee for raising the issues and suggesting the references Seo, 1990 and Russell, 1974] that motivated us to write this section.
Appendix A
In this appendix, the competitive firm 's behavior under total price uncertainty when its managers are risk neutral is examined. With risk neutrality, i.e., {/'(tt) = 0 , equations ( 1 0 Following the general model of interdependent markets, the covariance terms in (A l)-(A3) are not equal to zero under risk neutrality and their sign is determined by the interrelationship among markets. Now, the firm 's equilibrium under risk neutrality is solely established by market interdependencies. Using equations (2) and (3), the firm 's equilibrium under risk neutrality and market interdependencies is
M-pO,. -Mv =£ 0.
Equations ( 
Let the optim um capital and labor levels em ployed by the firm in (A 4)-(A 5) and in (A6)-(A 7) be (Kc, Lc) and (KD , L"), respectively. Clearly, once market interdependencies are taken into consideration, K c K u and L c =£ Lu Whether the input levels in (A4) and (A5) are greater than or 64 less than the input levels in (A6 ) and (A7) depends on interdependencies among output and factor mar kets that determine the sign of covariance terms in (Al) to (A3) and the resulting equilibrium in (A5) and (A6 ). The analysis is similar to the results dis cussed for a risk averse firm in Section III of the paper.
